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PRIVATE GOLF CLUBS: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
THOMAS H. SAWYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, American society has fought hard to elimi-
nate racial' and other types of discrimination2 with remarkable success.
Yet, society has not been overly concerned about equal treatment of wo-
men, particularly women in the professional environment.
Over the years, men have developed the "good ol' boy" network. They
have organized private clubs that were devoid of blacks, Jews, and women.
At first, these clubs were formed for political reasons, but as time passed,
discrimination became the primary purpose for the existence of the private
clubs. It is true that Americans have the constitutional right of freedom of
association. 3 This right opens the door to the right to discriminate if a
group of individuals wants to form a genuinely selective and exclusive,
"truly" private club.4 Yet, at the same time, Americans have the right to
equal protection5 under the law and not to be discriminated against. These
* Professor of Physical Education, Director of the Sport Management Programs, Indiana
State University, Department of Physical Education; B.S. Springfield College, 1968; M.P.E.
Springfield College, 1971; Ed.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1977. The
author has participated in sports as a player, coach, official, and administrator for the past 40
years. He teaches a variety of undergraduate and graduate sports management courses including
sports law. The author wants to thank Dr. Betty van der Smissen for her editorial assistance in the
preparation of this manuscript.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970), Civil Rights Act
of 1964, now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a-e) (West 1970), was needed for antidiscrimination
legislation covering public accommodations.
2. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
4. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
301-02 (1969); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), Olzman
v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1974), and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a,
avoided serious consideration of associational interests by relying on the strong presumption
which has developed in public accommodations case law that offering to serve the general public
negates a right to discriminate, while leaving open the possibility that "truly" private clubs might
be exempt from 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
5. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment which has had the greatest impact on dis-
crimination provides:
No state shall.. .deprive any person, of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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two rights appear to be in conflict; but, perhaps not if the purposes for
forming a genuinely selective and exclusive, "truly" private club is based on
freedom of association. However, if for example, a golf club is formed by
white males for the purpose of improving the business networking environ-
ment and excludes blacks, Jews, and women, the courts might not view this
as an appropriate reason for discrimination.
Professional women, like men, need to join golf and other professional
and social clubs to expand their business network. They are learning, how-
ever, that swinging a club can be easier than joining one. Women golfers
suffer from discrimination6, similar to Jews and blacks7, when it comes to
joining private golf clubs. In 1992, Vice President Quayle cancelled a sec-
ond round at Monterey's all-white Cypress Point because he felt it might
look bad to play there; but, he had no problem playing at all-male Burning
Tree where he holds an honorary membership.
Many private golf clubs throughout America discriminate against wo-
men in subtle ways. 9 However, outright exclusion of women from courses is
rare among the nation's 5,276 private clubs. t'
Private discrimination has been operating in the U.S. ever since the
country's inception. It was not until after the Civil War that Congress be-
gan to enact legislation to curb racial subordination and discrimination. 1
In 1964, Congress 2 enacted legislation that attempted to define the parame-
ters of a "truly" private club through the public accommodation clause.
Further, in 1987, Congress enacted broader civil rights legislation to attack
other forms of discrimination, namely gender.13
6. Janet Nelson & Pamela A. Maclean, Tee'd Off. Women Golfers Are Learning That Swing-
ing a Club Can Be Easier Than Joining One, WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS, at 64, 41-48 (April
1991).
7. Mike Royko, Jordan Can Wield a Club on his Own, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1991, at D12; S.
SMITH (1991). THE JORDAN RULES. (1991).
8. Maclean, supra note 6, at 48.
9. Such as: unequal tee times, restricted voting rights, and restricted access to club rooms. Id.
at 44. A divorced wife who was awarded country club membership in the divorce settlement
brought suit against the club after it terminated membership because of its policy of issuing family
memberships to adult males only. However under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal.Civ.
Code § 51, a non profit privately owned country club may be considered a "business establish-
ment" and therefore cannot discriminate. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 262
Cal.Reptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
10. Professional Golf Associations 1991 Annual Report to the membership.
11. Chronological list of civil rights legislation during and after the civil war era: Thirteenth
Amendment (1865), Civil Rights Act of 1866, Fourteenth Amendment (1868), Fifteenth Amend-
ment (1870), Civil Rights Amendment of 1870 (Enforcement Act), Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku
Klux Klan Act), and Civil Rights Act of 1875.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 1970).
13. See supra note 2.
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In 1968, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 14 revitalized the Civil Rights Act
of 186611 as an instrument with which to attack racial discrimination by
private clubs. Jones consequently reawakened the conflict between freedom
of association, which many believe gives private clubs a right to discrimi-
nate, and freedom from racial discrimination, guaranteed by the principles
of equality underpinning the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 6
Existing' 7 and present 8 legal doctrine provides no clear solution to the
conflict presented. The courts will be forced to develop a new doctrine
which balances the interests of the private clubs that wish to have exclusive
membership and individuals who wish to be able to join any club they per-
ceive would be of benefit to them.
Historically the courts have struggled with the question of exclusivity
without strict resolve. In Runyon v. McCrary,9 the Supreme Court held
that Section 1981 not only required a state to give blacks and whites the
same legal rights in contracting, but also forbade private racial discrimina-
tion in the making of contracts. Even before Runyon, the Court held that
Section 1981 forbade some kinds of racial discrimination by private
groups.20 However, the Supreme Court's2' present majority is not seeking
remedies for private discrimination. After unanimously confirming Run-
14. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
15. See supra note 1.
16. See Arthur Larson The New Law of Race Relations, Wis. L. REv. 470, 501-03 (1969);
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of
the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 523 (1974); Note, Association,
Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 470
(1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club Discrimination, Wis. L. REv. 595, 600-02 (1970).
A more thorough treatment of the problem is needed at this time for two reasons: (1) discrimina-
tion by private clubs is coming under increasing attack, making imminent the time for resolution
of the problem by the courts; and (2) several jurists have expressed a great regard for private
groups, namely Justice Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964), Lombard v. Loui-
siana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1963), and Moose Lodge No. 7 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972);
Justice Harlan in Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 367, 374 (1963); Justice Marshal in Moose
Lodge; and Justices White and Rehnquist in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Finally,
Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimi-
nation, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975) indicates that many other judges may share these views; there-
fore, the creation of an exemption from § 1981 for bona fide private groups is a clear possibility.
17. See Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom
from Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1441-76.
18. See Kenneth L. Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Con-
text, Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 46-51 (1989).
19. 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
20. Tillman, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Johnson v. Railroad Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975); and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). It should be
noted this last case was decided on the same day as Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
21. Karst, supra note 18, at 2.
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yon's vitality, the Court ruled five to four,22 that Section 1981 does not
provide a remedy in damages for an employer's racial harassment. The
Runyon and Patterson decisions provide a mixed message which exemplifies
the current state of civil rights in the Supreme Court.23
During the late eighties and early nineties, the homing principle at-
tracting the Court's present majority has been a model of formal racial neu-
trality that minimizes the remedial responsibilities of both government and
nongovernment actors.24 One major reason is that the model leaves un-
touched the private discrimination that is, and always has been, central to
racial, religious, and gender subordination. Civil rights activists interpret
recent decisions as a general inclination toward strict readings of civil rights
laws, and, more specifically, a rejection of the idea that private discrimina-
tion is a public responsibility.25
In 1989, Richmond v. J.A. Corson Co.26, assisted in the consolidation of
some congressional power. It is not merely the power to remedy "identi-
fied" discrimination, but according to Justice O'Connor, Congress has a
broad power "to define situations which Congress determines threaten
equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with the situations. ' '2 7 To
avoid any mistake about the implications of this expansive principle for af-
firmative action, Justice O'Connor specifies that "Congress may identify
and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination. ' 2 If the effects of
private discrimination hurt all Americans,29 Congress does seem the most
appropriate body to recognize these harms and to remedy them.
If Fullilove v. Klutznick 30 was a departure from the model of formal
neutrality, Corson 31 is a greater departure. Justice O'Connor, by her com-
ments in Corson, and also by her approving citation of two sweeping War-
22. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
23. Karst, supra note 18, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Karst, supra note 18, at 5.
26. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
27. Id. at 490.
28. Id.
29. Karst, supra note 18, at 9-11.
30. In Fullilove, the Court upheld an act of Congress appropriating funds to aid local public
works projects and requiring 10 percent of the money be used to hire minority contractors. Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Chief Justice Burger emphasized, 448 U.S. at 477-78, that
it was permissible for Congress to conclude that minority businesses had been disadvantaged in
obtaining public works contracts "by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior
discrimination." Id. at 477-78. Thus, the Chief Justice endorsed a broad congressional power to
go beyond formal neutrality in remedying the present effects of past public or private discrimina-
tion against minority contractors.
31. See S.A. Corson Co., 488 U.S. 469.
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ren Court endorsements 2 of congressional power, are thought to be go-
ahead signals to Congress. 3  The decisions consolidate in Congress a power
extending beyond the powers recognized in Jones34 and now Patterson 35 , in
the separate opinions in U.S. v. Guest.36 Congress's power to define an ine-
quality and provide a remedy is not limited to the spending of federal
money.37 It is not limited to affirmative action.38 It is not limited to promo-
tion of racial inequity.39 It is not limited to the correction of "state ac-
tion".' It is broad enough, for example, to support an act of Congress
forbidding private discrimination against women, and lesbians and gay
men, irrespective of any connection with interstate commerce or "state ac-
tion". In 1988, Congress used its consolidated civil rights powers to enact
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198741 over a Presidential veto.4' This
Act strengthens Title IXa 3 and gives a higher priority to the women's sports
movement, and women's rights in general.' The passing of the Restoration
Act demonstrates that the present Congress is using its power to define ine-
quality, providing a remedy for identified inequities, and supporting a broad
application of Title IX.
32. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
33. See Karst supra note 18 at 47.
34. See Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409.
35. See McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363.
36. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
37. See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditioning Spending: Federalism 's Trojan
Horse, Sup. CT. REV. 85 (1988).
38. Karst, supra note 18, at 47.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally, supra note 2.
42. Legislative history behind this Act: Since the 1984 Court ruling in Grove City v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984), numerous attempts have been made to skirt the decision. In 1984, the House
passed a Grove City bill, but was held captive by the Senate because it was laden with amendments
added by opponents in the Senate. In 1985, the bill was bottled up in a controversy over its
language on abortion. Specifically, "whether the bill would effect the provision of abortion services
in student and employee health insurance plans." Irvin Molotsky, House Passes Bill to Upset A
Limit On U.S. Rights Law, N.Y. TiMEs, March 3, 1988, at Al.
In January 1988 the Senate approved the bill (S-557). A month later the House approved the
Act. Upon approval of Congress of the Restoration Act, President Reagan vetoed the bill, assert-
ing that he did not oppose the concepts embodied in the Grove City legislation, rather he felt that
its application was overbroad. On March 22, 1988 Congress overrode President Reagan's veto of
the proposed Civil Rights Restoration Act (S-557).
43. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373-75 (1972), codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1982).
44. P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 Revitalization of Title IX,
I MARQ. SpTs. L.J. 149, 169 (1990).
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Integration is a form of acculturation. Legislation can change attitudes
by changing inappropriate behavior(s). A major success story in the last
thirty years can be found in the integfation of southern hotels and restau-
rants. This success can be attributed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964."5 The
sight of black and white patrons being served alongside each other at a dime
store lunch counter in Macon would have been astounding in 1950. The
positive side of the current civil rights consolidation is that the Supreme
Court at last has rebuilt a lasting and solid constitutional basis for Con-
gress46 to carry out the public responsibility to redress the effects of discrim-
ination in general, and in particular, the effects of private discrimination
that hurts all Americans. The only question left to be answered is whether
Congress will continue to identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination.
The purpose of this article is to: (1) introduce the reader to the legal
concerns relating to private golf club's admission/membership policies; (2)
discuss the legal doctrines of Freedom of Association and the Right of Pri-
vacy; (3) describe the limits of federal rights legislation; (4) address a pri-
vate club's right to discriminate; and (5) suggest possible strategies for the
development of compromise policies to limit private club discrimination.
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
This section addresses the definition of a private club, and the legal doc-
trines which might support a right to discriminate - (1) freedom of associa-
tion, and (2) the right to privacy.
A. The Private Club
PRIVATE47 is defined as affecting or belonging to private individuals as
distinct from the public in general. CLUB48 is defined as a voluntary, incor-
porated or unincorporated association of persons for common purposes of a
social, literary, investment, political nature, or the like. Association of per-
sons for promotion of some common object, such as literature, science, poli-
tics, good fellowship, etc., especially one jointly supported and meeting
periodically, membership is usually conferred by ballot and carries privilege
of exclusive use of club quarters, and the word also applies to a building,
apartment or room occupied by a club. Therefore, a PRIVATE CLUB might
45. See supra note 1.
46. Karst, supra note 18, at 51.
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990); People v. Powell, 274 N.W. 372, 373
(Mich. 1937).
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (6th ed. 1990).
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very well be a group of individuals, regardless of race, religion or gender,
banded together exclusively to participate in the activity of golf. Addition-
ally, a PRIVATE GOLF CLUB would have periodic meetings with membership
conferred by ballot. Membership carries privilege of exclusive use of the
club quarters and could exclude (discriminate) individuals (i.e. race, reli-
gion, and gender) who do not share the views and values that the club's
members wish to promote.
New York City's Human Rights Law49 forbids discrimination based on
race, creed, sex, and other grounds by any "place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement," but specifically exempts "any institution, club or
place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private." Further,
it provides that any "institution, club or place of public accommodation,"
other than a benevolent order or a religious corporation, "shall not be con-
sidered in its nature distinctly private" if it "has more than four hundred
(400) members, provide regular meal service and regularly receives pay-
ment ... directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the
furtherance of trade or business." Immediately after Local Law 63 became
effective, it was challenged and upheld. 0
49. A 1984 Amendment (Local Law 63), N.Y. Administrative Code § 8-102, subd. 9;
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1.
50. A consortium of private clubs brought an action seeking judgement declaring unconstitu-
tional a city law (Local Law 63) prohibiting discrimination by clubs which provided benefits to
business entities and to persons other than their own members, thereby assuming sufficient public
character so as to forfeit the "distinctly private" exemption under the law. The Supreme Court,
Grossman, J., declared the law constitutional, and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court
(New York), Appellate Division, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152, affirmed, and the plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 505 N.E.2d 915 affirmed and
the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1) the consortium had stand-
ing to challenge constitutionality of law on behalf of its members; (2) law's antidiscrimination
provisions were not unconstitutional on their face; and (3) consortium failed to establish exemp-
tion deeming benevolent orders and religious corporations to be "distinctly private" violated equal
protection. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice
Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. New York State Club
Assoc., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 101 (1988).
19931
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B. Freedom of Association
Freedom of association"' evolved to protect the ability of an individual
to join5" with others for the expression or promotion of political ideas.5 3
This freedom of association has little to do with a right to exclude others on
the basis of race or gender. 4 The right to exclude impairs the freedom to
associate of the person who wants to join. Most social clubs are apolitical
in nature and would find it extremely difficult to prove that they require a
right to discriminate for the purposes of political expression.
C. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy may provide a better basis for the right to discrimi-
nate. The Supreme Court has established this right to freedom from gov-
ernment intrusion in specific situations involving family, procreation, and
the home.5
Justice Goldberg, in Bell v. Maryland, stated:
"Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the con-
stitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any
person or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely
on the basis of personal prejudices including race. These and other
51. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), freedom of association was formally recog-
nized by the Court. It struck down a state statute compelling disclosure of membership lists. See
also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960). See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
52. In NAACP, 357 U.S. 449, at 460-61, the word "association" frequently was used to mean
an act rather than a group, and the right identified by the decision was referred to as "freedom to
engage in association" and "freedom to associate" in addition to freedom of association.
53. See Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to
Privacy, 64 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1195, 1197 (1970). Freedom of association may have no status at all
independent of freedom of expression. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)
(dicta suggesting that the freedom of association includes the right join nonpolitical groups as
well).
54. Runyan, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); N.Y State
Club Ass'n, Inc, 487 U.S. 101; Kiwanis Intern.v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F.Supp 1381
(D.N.J. 1986), rev'd 806 F.2d 468, rehearing denied 811 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1986) service organiza-
tion lacked distinctive indicia of intimate association that would afford constitutional protection to
it's members decision to exclude women solely on basis of their sex.
55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to acquire contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene material in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to use contraceptives). See Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974).
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rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves
constitutionally protected liberties."56
Justice Douglas's opinion in Bell relied on the home as the locus of that
right "... home, of course, is the essence of privacy, in no way dedicated to
public use, in no way extending an invitation to the public.. . 57
Justice Douglas and Marshal in their dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Iris"8 stated:
..the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. . .create a zone of privacy which precludes government
from interfering with private clubs... Government may not tell a
man or woman who his associates must be. The individual may be
selective as he desires." 59
These comments from several Supreme Court cases may suggest some
Court members had held that private clubs do have a constitutional right to
discriminate. However, they do not amount to binding precedent for such a
conclusion. Nor can such binding conclusions be drawn from decisions of
cases involving free association or right to privacy. Therefore, while the
concept of a zone of privacy might be the best foundation upon which a
constitutional right to discriminate could be based, no decision has estab-
lished that right as a matter of law.6
III. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Private clubs were left untouched by the federal61 civil rights legislation
of the past three decades.62 The public accommodations title exempted
56. 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964).
57. Id. at 253; See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
58. 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972).
59. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), the Court quoted approvingly
Douglas's Moose Lodge dictum, but countered it with the statement in Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973), that the right to discriminate was not entitled to "affirmative constitutional pro-
tection." 417 U.S. 566 (1979). See Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
60. Henkin, supra note 55, at 1459.
61. Wallace F. Caldwell, State Public Accommodation Laws, Fundamental Liberties and En-
forcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REv. 841 (1965).
62. The major pieces of legislation were the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 243; the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81; Education Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 82 Stat. 365; and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-259, 102 Stat. 28. Public Accommodations were dealt with in Title II of the 1964 Act (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970)). Employment discriminations were treated in Title VII of that
Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). The housing discriminations were treated in provi-
sions of the Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970)). Women's rights in educational institu-
tions were treated in Title IX of the 1972 Act, 86 Stat. 373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-88 (1982)). The women's sports movement and women's rights in general were treated in
the provisions of the Restoration Act (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)).
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from its coverage "private clubs ... not in fact open to the public. 6 3 Be-
cause private clubs were excluded from the coverage of the legislation, the
practice of exclusive membership continued.
A. The Public Accommodation Title and The Private Club Exemption
A primary force behind the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
the need for antidiscrimination legislation covering public accommoda-
tions.64 The public accommodation title exempted from its coverage private
clubs and other less significant establishments. 65 The exemption reflects
Congress's attempt to address discrimination in public accommodations
rather than in private clubs.
After the passage of the Act, a number of restaurants, amusement
parks, and swimming pools sought to escape the statute by alleging private
club status.6 6 The resulting litigation produced a substantial amount of case
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
64. John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855, 859-67 (1966).
65. The public accommodations provisions do not reach small bars, grocery stores, and de-
partment stores not selling food in general or for consumption on the premises, retail shops, and
services such as those of doctors, dentists and skilled tradesmen. See Arthur Larson, The New
Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470, 475-76 (1969).
The public accommodations and housing statutes exempt "A New England Bed and Break-
fast" with less than five lodging units and occupied by the owner. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b)(1),
3603(b)(2) (1970). The housing statute allows private clubs to give preference to members. See 42
U.S.C. § 3607 (1970). The employment discrimination statute exempts firms having under 15 em-
ployees and private clubs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970). See Note, Section 1981 and Private
Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1441-
42.
66. An incorporated swimming club was a "public accommodation" within the Law Against
Discrimination, and was not within private facility exemption, where it was organized for profit
and controlled by stockholders rather than members, and it appeared to solicit membership, even
though it did not engage in public advertising, was limited to specific number of members, and
referred to itself as a private facility, Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 219 A.2d
161, 47 N.J. 25 (N.J. 1966); court looked to the intent of the organizers of the club, denying an
exemption where the club was formed to evade the public accommodation law, United States v.
Northwest La. Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151, 153-53 (W.D. La. 1966); an existing dinner
club attempted to establish itself as private and failed to extend club facilities to nonmembers in
disregard of club bylaws, United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D.
La. 1967); one of the purposes of public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was to eliminate unfairness, humiliation, and insult of racial discrimination in facilities
which purport to serve the general public, Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc., 516
F.2d 64, rehearing denied 520 F.2d 943 (C.A. La. 1975); statute establishing a statutory civil right
guaranteeing all persons access to public accommodations free of any discrimination whatsoever is
qualified by limiting language of further statutes restricting scope of prohibition to denials of equal
accommodations based on race, creed, or color, Riegler v. Holiday Skating Rink, Inc., 227
N.W.2d 759, 393 Mich. 607 (Mich. 1975); and a health and exercise club which did not exercise
membership selectivity and which was a business operated for profit and not controlled by club
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law which gave a strict construction to the club exemption.67 Further, in
Cornelius V Benevolent Protective Order of Elks,6" the court established a
set of factors to determine whether an organization is a "truly" private club
members was not exempt from Equal Accommodations Act as a "private club," Vidrich v. Vic
Tanny Intern, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 482, 102 Mich. App. 230 (Mich. App. 1980).
67. The courts developed a number of factors which could be examined to determine whether
the alleged clubs were "truly" private or in fact "sham clubs" actually open only to the (white)
public. One area of inquiry has been whether there is evidence of genuine selectivity. Decisions
finding clubs to be public accommodations found significant the following: the absence of formal
membership selection procedures, Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Solomon v.
Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (D.C. Fla. 1973); Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F.
Supp. 378, rev'd 632 F.2d 309 (D.D.Va. 1979); U.S. v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles,
Milwaukee Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. 1174 (D.C. Wis. 1979); Vidrick v. Vic Tanny Intern,
Inc., 301 N.W.2d 482, 102 Mich. App. 230 (Mich. App. 1980); U.S. Power Squadrons v. State
Human Rights Appeal Board, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, reargument
dismissed 468 N.Y.S.2d 107, 60 N.Y.2d 682, 455 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1983); Brown v. Loudoun
Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. Va. 1983); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,
724 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1990); failure to reject a significant number of white applicants,
Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh N.C., Inc., 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968);
Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex. 1987); the
absence or insubstantiality of dues and exceedingly large membership lists, Bradshaw v.
Whigham, II Race Rel. L. Rep. 934, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1966); advertising as evidence of a lack of
selectivity, Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 219 A,2d 161, 47 N.J. 25 (N.J. 1966);
U.S. v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 376 (E.D. La. 1969); Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 359 F.
Supp. 41 rev'd 632 F.2d 309 (D.D. Va. 1979).
Other decisions have looked to the extent to which the membership exercised rights of control
over the alleged clubs. Courts denying the exemption have considered as relevant evidence that:
members did not own facilities, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); and Bell v. Kenwood
Golf& Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.Md. 1970); profits from the club facilities were
retained by the operator, United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); members
had no control over the operations of the establishment, Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v.
Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161, 47 N.J. 25 (N.J. 1966); and Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143,
1155 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
The courts have required, in some cases, some purpose other than the exclusion of blacks from
an otherwise public facility, United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F.Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.
Ala. 1970). Only rarely have the private club claims been sustained, Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (dictum: although a golf course must accept black players
and spectators, a golf association with 75 members, not a party defendant, would be exempted);
Wesley v. City of Savannah, Ga., 294 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. Ga. 1969) (dictum: the "public accom-
modations" provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not applicable to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public); and Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 6
Cal.Rptr. 490, 182 C.A.2d 506, 87 A.L.R.2d 113 (Cal. App. 1960) (dictum: there is nothing in the
civil rights statutes which had effect of preventing defendant from maintaining gymnasium for
such persons as it saw proper to accommodate and from excluding such persons as is saw proper
to exclude).
See generally Note, Public Accommodations Laws and the Private Club, 54 GEO. L.J. 915
(1966); Comment, Public Accommodations: What is a Private Club?, 30 MONT. L. REV. 47 (1968);
Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112 (1969).
68. 383 F. Supp. 1182 (D.C. Conn. 1974).
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within public accommodations provision. The factors were: (a) selective-
ness of group in admission of members, (b) existence of formal membership
procedures, (c) degree of membership control over internal governance, (d)
history of the organization, (e) use of club facilities by non-members, (f)
substantiality of dues, (g) whether organization advertises, and (h) predomi-
nance of profit motive.69 Later, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Wooster Brush Company, the court developed the following
definition for a "private membership club"...
"the organization must be a club, i.e., an association of persons for
social or recreational purposes or for promotion of common literary,
scientific, or political objective; organization's objective must be le-
gitimate and not a sham; organization must be private, not public;
and, organization must require meaningful conditions of limited
membership."70
B. Title IX
Many private golf clubs encourage local high schools or colleges/uni-
versities to use their courses for practice, home meets, and championship
events. Interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs must abide by
Title IX legislation. Therefore, clubs that have discriminatory admission/
membership policies raise the question of the legal status of using these sites
for practice and competition by girls'/women's golf teams.
In 1972 Congress passed the Educational Amendments legislation71
which included Title IX72 drafted to assist in the development of women's
sports and women's rights in general within the education arena. However,
Title IX was not constructed to implement prohibitions on athletic pro-
grams of educational institutions.73 It was developed to force public schools
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201(e), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 2000a(e).
70. 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (198 ) aff'd in part, rev'd in part 727 F.2d 566 (D.C. Ohio 1981).
71. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. See generally, Janet Laminersen Kuhn, Title IX Employment and Athletics are Outside
HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 56-63 (1976); Villalobos, supra note 44; In the beginning,
Title IX had limited scope, covering only those educational programs receiving federal financial
assistance such as vocational, bilingual and compensatory education programs. However, the
HEW interpreted the Act broadly applying to educational institutions or agencies discriminating
in athletic or physical education programs. Further, in HEW's view, the only test of coverage was
whether the institution or agency was a recipient of any federal assistance; if so, all activities,
including the athletic program, come within the provisions of the Act. This interpretation was
held until the Supreme Court decided Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). The
Court's decision left women's athletic programs with no substantive protection under Title IX,
since most sports programs receive no direct federal funding. The prior interpretation by the
HEW was related to indirect federal funding to educational institutions.
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and colleges and universities to make a commitment to women's athletics.
During the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, Title IX was applied
broadly, but the Reagan Administration, while claiming to be a proponent
of women's sports, backed the Grove City College v. Bell" decision and its
narrowing effect.75 However, the Bush Administration, along with the
Democratic Senate, indicated that the women's sports movement, and wo-
men's rights in general, should have a higher priority now than during the
Reagan era.7 6 Title IX is to women's equal rights (in the athletic arena and
education) as the Civil Rights Acts7 7 are to the elimination of racial and
other discrimination. With the failure of the attempted ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment,7" Title IX stands alone at the Federal level to
fight against gender discrimination (there is some state level legislation).
The Amendment would have raised the examination of gender discrimina-
tion to a stricter standard of judicial scrutiny in equal protection and
discrimination cases.79 If the Amendment had passed, it would have supple-
mented and served to enhance the strength of Title IX.
C. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (passed in 1988)
During the seventies and early eighties, civil rights issues continued to
appear before the bench, particularly issues that dealt with various women's
rights concerns. With the Grove City case neutralizing Title IX and the
failure of the Equal Rights Amendment to be ratified, women's rights be-
came a focus for the courts. The leaders of the women's rights movement
lobbied long and hard for the Civil Rights Restoration Act to protect the
rights of women within the athletic arena.
The eighties and the Reagan era proved to be a frustrating period for
women's rights in general, including those within the athletic arena. From
1984 until March of 1988, Congress struggled to enact the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987.80 This legislation rendered Grove City"1 and
74. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
75. Sullivan, The Law That Needs New Muscle, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 4, 1985, at 9.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 11.
78. Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); The proposed
Equal Rights Amendment, which would have barred all state governments and the federal gov-
ernment from denying "equality of rights under the law.. .on account of sex,"(Uhlir, Athletics and
the University: The Post-Women's Era, 73 ACADEME 25, 25-29 (July-August 1987)) was defeated
in 1982, when the extended period for its ratification expired.
79. See Villalobos, supra note 44, at 150.
80. See supra note 61.
81. See Caldwell, supra note 61.
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O'Connor v. Peru State College 2 moot as to whether the programmatic ap-
proach and purpose distinction approach are viable. The Restoration Act
changed the wording of Title IX to state that discrimination was prohibited
in the programs and activities of any recipient of federal funds.83 The Act
redefined the previously troublesome terms: program or activity, and recipi-
ent. Previously these terms were vaguely defined. Program or activity was
redefined to mean, in the case of higher education institutions, "a college,
university, or post secondary institution, or a public system of higher educa-
tion.. .any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance."84 Recipi-
ent was defined as "any state or political subdivision thereof, . . . or any
public or private agency, institution or organization, or other entity.., to
which Federal financial assistance is extended (directly or indirectly)
through another entity or a person." 5 The Act clarifies that entire institu-
tions and agencies are covered by Title IX and other federal anti-discrimi-
nation laws if any program or activity within the institution receives federal
aid.86 This Act was designed to reverse the effects of the Grove City ruling
by assuring that Title IX now applies to all institutions whose students re-
ceive federal student aid. The passing of the Restoration Act demonstrated
that the legislators in the late eighties were supporting a broad application
of Title IX.
D. Do The Doctrines of Freedom of Association and the Right of Privacy
Guarantee a Right to Discriminate?
The conflict caused by the application of §§ 1981 and 2000a to private
clubs raises the question of the legal status of the right to discriminate
claimed by these clubs. If private clubs could cite no significant legal doc-
trine supporting discrimination, the courts could apply § 1981. On the
other hand, if discrimination was clearly protected by § 2000a(e) or the
Constitution, clubs could routinely be exempted from § 1981. However,
there is no conclusive law supporting either of these propositions. There-
fore, the courts cannot rely on existing legal doctrine to escape the ultimate
task of formulating new doctrine reconciling the conflicting constitutional
principles.8 7 Furthermore, Congress needs to develop appropriate legisla-
tion to satisfy the need for freedom of association and the right not to be
discriminated against.
82. 605 F. Supp.753 (D.Neb. 1986), aff'd 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986).
83. The Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
84. Id. at § 3 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(a) (1989)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Henkin supra note 55, at 1452.
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If the exemption of private clubs to be free from discrimination in
§ 2000a(e) applied to § 1981, clubs meeting the test could continue to dis-
criminate until either a new Thirteenth Amendment is enacted or state po-
lice power88 legislation brought them within the reach of the anti-
discrimination requirements. The court of appeals in Tillman 19 specifically
held that the private club exemption "of necessity operates as an exception
to the Act of 1866 in any case where the Act prohibits the same conduct
which is saved as lawful by the terms of the 1964 Act."90 The Court's con-
clusion has received support in the commentary on the case.91
While the conclusion that the private club exemption repealed part of
the broad scope of the 1866 Act is plausible, it is hardly beyond dispute.92
In order for an implied repeal to exist, there must be irreconcilable conflict
between the two acts. This does not exist unless the private club exemption
is interpreted as making discrimination by private clubs lawful. Yet, no
language in the 1964 Act singles out any private discrimination which
88. States have recently indicated increasing interest in moving against private club discrimi-
nation. A Maine statute prohibits discrimination by holders of state licenses to dispense "food,
liquor or any service," corporations chartered under Maine law, and corporations authorized to
do business in the state. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 1301-A (Supp. 1974). See also Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 43, § 133 (Smith-Hurd 1944); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-10-13.1 (Supp. 1973). See James
Kilpatrick, Social Clubs Have Right to Privacy, THE BLADE, Toledo, OH, Feb. 15, 1991, at A5;
and Reed Mackenzie, Open Tee Times Test Positive After Minnesota Passes Law, USA TODAY,
October 29, 1991, at CIO. The refusal of the Maine State Liquor Commission to renew the liquor
licenses of 15 Elks Lodges was upheld in B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607
(Me. 1972), 411 U.S. 924 (1973). The opinion has been criticized for ignoring the possibility that
by requiring a waiver of associational freedom the statute imposes an unconstitutional condition
on the issuance of licenses. See 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1069, 1074-75 (1973). However, Ingraham
has been distinguished in later cases because it involved the unique power of the state under the
Twenty-first Amendment to regulate liquor use, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (state
power to prohibit in bars sexual displays otherwise protected as First Amendment expression).
See Note, The Scope of Permissible State Interference with Racial Discrimination by Private Frater-
nal Organizations, 4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 338, 353-60 (1973). A consortium of private clubs sought to
have declared unconstitutional a city law prohibiting discrimination by clubs which provide bene-
fits to business entities and to persons other than their own members, thereby assuming sufficient
public character so as to forfeit "distinctly private" exemption from the city anti-discrimination
law. The court held that the law was a valid constitutional exercise of "police power" and that it
did not violate club members' right to privacy, free speech and association under the Federal
Constitution in N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. N.Y.C., 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152
(N.Y.App.Div. 1986) aff'd 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987) aff'd 108 S.Ct. 2225
(1988); N.Y. Administrative Code § 8-102, subd. 9.
89. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
90. Id. at 1214.
91. See Note, Private Clubs: The Right to Discriminate in Admission Policies, 34 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 447 (1973); See generally Note, Private Clubs Expressly Excepted from the Coverage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Constitute an Exemption from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 6 GA. L. REV.
813, 821 (1972).
92. See Henkin supra note 55.
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"shall be lawful." Further, a saving clause was included providing that
"nothing in this subchapter shall preclude any individual.. .from asserting
any right based on Federal or State laws which are not inconsistent" are
saved, the correct meaning of the private club exemption must be
determined. 93
IV. A PRIVATE CLUB'S RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE:
BUT AT WHAT COST?
There seems to be no clear cut constitutional or legislative solution to
the question of whether or not a private club has the right to discriminate.
The process of creating a policy defining permissible discrimination,
whether it be racial, religious or gender, by clubs requires a weighing of
strong opposing interests. Before a process can be initiated to create such a
policy, the costs of protecting private club's rights to discriminate, and the
cost of restricting such rights, must be reviewed.
A. The Costs of Preserving and Protecting Private Club Discrimination
If society decides to preserve and protect private club discrimination, it
opens the door wide to (1) perpetuating the all white male private club, (2)
judicial validation of discrimination, (3) the denial of equal opportunities
for all citizens, and (4) the demise of social integration.
1. Perpetuating the All White Male Private Club
America is considered a free country by most. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment94 , the Civil Rights Act of 18669 , the Civil Rights Act of 196496, the
Educational Amendments of 197297, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
198798, and many cases over the years have attempted to establish a dis-
crimination-free society. Yet today, the concept of inherent racial, religious
or gender inequality survives in the bylaws99 and admission policies 00 of
93. See Note, Private Clubs: The Right to Discriminate in Admissions Policies, supra note 91,
at 450-51.
94. See supra note 11.
95. Civil Rights Act of 1866, supra note 1.
96. Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 12.
97. See Educational Amendments of 1972, supra note 43.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1987, supra note 2.
99. United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Commonwealth Against Discrimination, 463
N.E.2d 1151, 391 Mass. 594 (Mass. 1984); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d
212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 40 Ct. App. 3d 72, reh'g denied and modified (Cal. 1985); and Rotary
Club of Durate v. Board of Directors of Rotary Intern., 224 Cal.Rptr. 213, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986), review denied; jurisdiction postponed 107 S.Ct. 396, 93 L.Ed.2d 350
(1986).
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private clubs which can reject a black, Jew or female applicant with no
more justification than "no - allowed." The use of classifications is psy-
chologically harmful to any group being discriminated against. This type of
discrimination signals to other members of the white male "good ol' boy"
network that deliberate discrimination has not yet become discredited
enough to express proudly and openly. The civil rights legislation over the
years presents an opportunity to eliminate some of the remaining vestiges of
discrimination which would be lost by a court decision broadly protecting
private discrimination.
2. Judicial Validation of Discrimination
In numerous cases over a period of years, the Supreme Court has em-
phatically established the proposition that discrimination is irrational and
wrongful.10 1 The Court could not make a decision legitimating discrimi-
nation practiced by private clubs because it would imply government ap-
proval of the theory of inequality among blacks, Jews, and women. It is
very doubtful that any court will establish a foothold for private club dis-
crimination in America.
3. The Denial of Equal Opportunity to All Citizens
White-only private social clubs have been part of American society
prior to the founding of this country.10 2 Membership in many of the private
clubs can be an important source of business opportunity (developing new
contacts, expanding networks, or gaining new clients). There is evidence
that executive job attainment and promotion is often dependent on club
membership. 103 In many small communities these clubs may, and most
likely do, hold a monopoly on a particular type of recreational facility (golf
course, swimming pool, or tennis courts) and/or dining establishment. The
continuance of blanket discriminatory exclusion would deny these advan-
tages to blacks, Jews, and women, regardless of how well they might meet
other nondiscriminatory admissions criteria.
100. See United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); People of State of
N.Y. by Abrams v. Ocean Club, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 489 (D.C. N.Y. 1984); United States Jaycees v.
Cedar Rapids Jaycees, 614 F. Supp. 515 (D.C. Iowa 1985), 794 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1985).
101. See Tillman, supra note 4 and 89; N.Y State Club Ass'n, Inc., supra note 88; and Rotary
Club of Duarte, supra note 99.
102. See supra note 83, at 1186-90; these clubs take the form of thousands of country clubs
(golf), lawn and tennis clubs, city clubs, athletic clubs, fraternal orders, etc.
103. Id. at 1188, 1216-17; see also supra note 88.
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4. The Demise of Social Integration
Private clubs are often indistinguishable in their operations from public
restaurants, pools, golf courses, tennis courts, rod and gun clubs open to the
public. Yet, by establishing the policies outlined in the Cornelius ° case,
many groups (not just white males) can escape social integration mandated
by court decisions and legislation. To that extent that there is a national
policy of promoting integration (race and gender) for its own sake, this pol-
icy is undermined by the maintenance of a system in which any group can,
in effect, purchase the right to maintain segregation (§ 2000a(e)).
In many private clubs, the significance of being unwanted by some of
the members may be relatively unimportant compared to the benefits of
gaining access to the business network. Section 1981 can promote actual
integration by invalidating restrictive covenants and bylaws in organiza-
tions; Section 2000a(e) defines what "truly" private clubs are while outlin-
ing what a "public accommodation" is in the eyes of the justice system;
Title IX of the Educational Amendments can assist women in developing
sports programs. Finally, the Restoration Act further strengths the wo-
men's foothold in the athletic arena as well as women's rights in general.
The legislation discussed in Part III has acutely limited the opportuni-
ties for segregation. Further, it has begun to change the over-all behavior of
society by encouraging social integration and discouraging discrimination.
This legislation has encouraged nonprejudiced club members to invite
blacks, Jews, and women to associate with them. Furthermore, local
groups can eliminate discriminatory membership criteria/restrictions with-
out the threat of sanctions from affiliated groups nationally or
internationally.
B. The Costs of Eliminating Private Club Discrimination
Private clubs are no longer fashionable in American society. If a study
was done to ascertain the composition of private clubs, the results would
more than likely indicate that the vast majority of the members are "pre-
baby boomers". 10 The "baby boomer" generation are not joiners or heavy
church goers. This generation may be the demise of the "truly" private
clubs in America. Like all male colleges in America, private clubs will be-
come extinct. There are basically three costs of eliminating private club
discrimination to society - (1) forced social integration, and (2) impairment
of freedom to associate, and (3) impairment of the right to privacy.
104. See supra note 68.
105. The baby boomer generation includes those born from 1946 through 1966.
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1. Forced Social Integration
Section 1981 does not, nor is it intended to, completely eliminate discre-
tion in the admission of new persons to the club. It merely prohibits the use
of discriminatory criteria to deny admission to blacks, and Section 2000a
protects others from discriminatory actions in places of public accommoda-
tion. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution protects the "natural
rights" that everyone has, such as the right to: (a) join voluntarily with
others for any benign purpose; (b) establish by mutual consent reasonable
rules for governing group activity; (c) extend invitations to others to join as
a matter of unfettered discretion; and (d) leave the group or disband it at
will.
The specific interest threatened is the desire of some people to prevent
inter-racial, or -religious social contact because they find it unpleasant to
have to talk to blacks or Jews, to see them, to be in close proximity to them,
or to have them participate in club activities. In American society, these
people are forced to interact with blacks and Jews on a daily basis. Why
not disregard past prejudices and open the door to social intercourse? The
worst that could happen is that they might find they like them.
The right of a person to select others to invite into one's home on a
completely arbitrary basis might be considered a basic element of liberty. 10 6
It may be desirable to extend this sort of sanctuary from government super-
vision beyond the home to private clubs. Then again, it might not be
desirable.
2. Impairment of the Freedom to Associate and the Right to Privacy
Americans' freedom to associate and the right to privacy are "natural
rights" (see Part II). These rights predate government and the mere elimi-
nation of private clubs will not prove to be an impairment. These rights are
guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment. It is not necessary to have a private
club in order to freely associate with whomever one wants to or to maintain
the right to privacy in one's life.
V. STRATEGIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES TOWARD
PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
Private clubs were around long before America was founded and they
continue to exist today. It is likely that private clubs will exist far into the
future. Therefore, it would be wise to develop strategies for the develop-
ment of policies toward private club discrimination rather than wait for
106. The Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
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their demise. If the courts and government can agree that private clubs are
an extension to the freedom of association and the right to privacy, then it is
appropriate to develop a strict definition of a private club exemption that
seeks a remedy to the discrimination issue(s). In a previous commentary'0 7
on Section 1981, the commentator suggested a few alternatives to Section
1981, with corresponding degrees of infringement on private clubs freedom
to discriminate. The alternatives were: (a) to define an exemption from
§ 1981; and (b) to apply § 1981 to private clubs subject to interpretative
limitations.
A. Defining an Exemption from § 1981
Section 2000a(e) provides a private club exemption within the public
accommodation title. However, courts are continually frustrated when
forced to apply § 1981 to a case, since the decision is not as simple as
merely granting or denying an exemption. Because the costs of protecting
private discrimination may be substantial, it is important that future courts
interested in preserving some degree of private club autonomy choose some-
thing less than a blanket exemption from § 1981 and have alternatives to
consider.
1. Exempting All Bonafide Private Clubs
A bonafide private club would be defined as a club "not in fact open to
the public", and it would have the right to discriminate under federal law.
Further, the criteria to be used in determining if a club is "truly private"
would be (a) § 2000a(a-e)1° 8, and (b) the factors defined in Cornelius.'°9
This solution would open the door to the costs of protecting private dis-
crimination as discussed previously.
2. Exempting Only Private Clubs in Which Extraordinary Associational
Interests are Threatened
Some commentators have suggested that a constitutional right to dis-
criminate could be based on a showing that discrimination is necessary to
preserve the purpose and nature of the particular club.110 The factual char-
acteristics which would satisfy this test"I might be (a) members have joined
107. See Henkin supra note 55, at 1470-76.
108. Civil Rights Act of 1966, supra note 1.
109. See supra note 68.
110. See Note, Association, Privacy and Private Clubs: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 469-70 (1970); Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of
Private Club Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REV. 108, 136-41 (1972); see Runyon, 427 U.S. 160.
111. See Henkin, supra note 55, at 1471-72.
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together primarily for fellowship with each other or primarily to share the
use of a facility (in some recreational clubs, or to obtain services); (b) the
nature of the activity within the club (none business nature); (c) the size of
the membership; 112 (d) the members all know each other; and (e) regularity
of club meetings and use of the club facilities whether it be independently or
randomly.
This approach would improve the potential for access to clubs by all
oppressed groups and facilitate some integration. However, it would still
preserve a private club's right to discriminate.
B. Applying § 1981 to Private Groups Subject to Interpretative
Limitations
The following are suggestions of how the courts could interpret § 1981
to provide limitations to discrimination yet allow private clubs their free-
dom to associate. It has been suggested" 3 that there are four interpretative
limitations that could be employed: (a) prohibiting the use of race, religion,
and gender by groups employing objective admissions criteria; (b) freezing
past admission criteria; (c) requiring that groups justify the use of subjective
screening procedures which have the effect of excluding blacks, Jews, or
women; and (d) judicial review of admissions decisions.
1. Prohibiting the Use of Race, Religion, and Gender by Groups
Employing Objective Admissions Criteria
It is important to understand that there are two types of private clubs:
(a) those which exercise selectivity by excluding categories of persons, and
(b) those which interview prospective applicants and decide on extending
membership on the basis of subjective criteria that are usually unstated.
The first group may restrict entry on the basis of criteria such as education,
income, political affiliation or professional status."' The members of the
group do not attempt to judge the individual personal characteristics of ap-
plicants who fit into acceptable categories. Since private clubs in this cate-
gory resemble a public accommodation , any person who belongs to the
appropriate category will be admitted and served. The courts applying a
strict interpretation of §§ 1981, 2000a would not allow such a club to use
112. See N.Y. State Club Association, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 392.
113. See Henkin supra note 55, at 1472-76.
114. These clubs are generally large clubs such as Elks, Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary, and United
States Jaycees; or professional associations such as American Medical Association, American Bar
Association, American Physical Therapists Association, etc.
115. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
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discriminative criteria. This means that blacks, Jews, and women who meet
every other qualification will be admitted.
The second type of club" 6 has preserved the ability to reject an appli-
cant because he/she "would not fit in" or because members "do not like
him/her." Even a white male applicant in many ways similar to the ex-
isting members will not be admitted if a number of existing members could
be expected not to "like" him. A strict application of any of the civil rights
legislation would not guarantee a black, Jew, or female applicant admission
to these clubs. The civil rights statutes entitle people to the "same right" as
white males; such a right would not include actual admission because no
white male has guaranteed admission to these highly selective clubs. As
stated before, this type of club could reject a non-white male applicant after
formal consideration because the membership simply "did not like" the ap-
plicant. The court could force the club to integrate, but the disruption
would far outweigh the benefit.
The major benefit of this approach, at least with the first type of club,
which includes the vast majority of private clubs, would be the abandon-
ment of racist and discriminatory bylaws and admissions policies and the
practice of summarily rejecting blacks, Jews, and female applicants. How-
ever, actual integration would be limited by the fact that groups could shift
their admissions policies and continue to exclude blacks, Jews, and women
for "subjective" reasons.' 17 Therefore, after eliminating overt discrimina-
tory practices, the next obstacle to social integration of private clubs is the
improper use of "subjective" criteria.
2. Freezing Past Admissions Criteria
This approach would deny groups which had used only objective admis-
sions criteria the right to subjective criteria that would allow them to con-
tinue excluding blacks, Jews, and women. The intimate social clubs where
discrimination is profound will not change in their use of "subjective" crite-
ria for admissions. However, they are the clubs least likely to want to be
penetrated by blacks, Jews, and women. This approach would offer the
greatest access to private clubs for blacks, Jews, and women.
116. Examples of these type of clubs might be country clubs, supper/dinner clubs, lawn and
tennis clubs, polo clubs, etc.
117. The first private club case to confront this issue was Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
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3. Requiring that Clubs Justify the Use of Subjective Screening
Procedures Which Have the Effect of Excluding Blacks, Jews,
or Women
This option would require all clubs to justify why subjective admissions
procedures, that have the effect of excluding blacks, Jews, and women, are
necessary to preserve the purpose and nature of the club. The court would
look to characteristics of the private club and compare it with the factors
discussed earlier.118 The test would be whether the club requires the use of
"subjective" admissions criteria. No club would be permitted to justify an
exclusion on the basis of discrimination itself.'1 9
The legal basis of this option would be that the unnecessary use of the
"subjective" criteria is an indirect method of denying blacks, Jews, and wo-
men the "same right" guaranteed by § 1981.l 2°The test here might be
thought of as requiring a showing of "social necessity" rather then "busi-
ness necessity" as shown in the Griggs case."2 The club would have to show
a "social necessity" before it would be allowed to exercise "arbitrary" per-
sonal preference in the selection of new members to the detriment of blacks,
Jews, and women.
4. Judicial Review of Admission Decisions
This alternative would be the most extreme. It suggests that the court
attempt to second-guess the club's reasons for excluding an applicant. The
club would be required to show rational reasons other than race, religion,
gender, or other arbitrary preference for excluding blacks, Jews, or women.
This solution would come the closest to eliminating the ability of clubs to
exercise preference in judging the nondiscriminatory characteristics of an
applicant. 122
118. See supra note 68.
119. While a requirement of approval by two-thirds of the membership might be acceptable
for a small "bona fide private membership club, Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256 (D.C. Mich.
1981), it might serve no purpose independent of discriminatory exclusion of blacks, Jews, and
women when used by a large golf or tennis or swimming club, Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country
Club, Inc., supra note 54; Olzman, 495 F.2d 1333.
120. See generally supra note 52, at 1475. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
121. Id.
122. See Henkin supra note 55, at 1475.
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C. Questioning Why it is Appropriate or Necessary
to Maintain a Private Club
American society is very complicated and always in flux. Everyone must
be patient and continually apply diplomatic and economic pressure toward
private clubs that discriminate against women and minorities as one posi-
tive way to encourage behavioral change. Beyond this effort, here are a few
examples of actions every individual can take, and questions that should be
asked in order to reduce the discriminatory practices of private clubs: 1 3
0 ACTION:
Check your company's policies regarding private clubs.
QUESTIONS:
* Does it hold meetings or events at clubs that discriminate in any
way?
" Does it offer memberships to discriminatory clubs to executives?
* If you answered yes to either or both of the foregoing questions,
strive to have the policies changed.
0 ACTION:
Check your organization's policies on fundraising events.
QUESTIONS:
* Are they held at private clubs that exclude different groups?
* If there is no policy regarding this, suggest that one be drafted.
o ACTION
* Check your city, county, and state's policies relating to private
clubs. 124
o ACTION
If you belong to a club that has discriminatory policies, find allies
within the club and work together to change them or take them to
court.
ACTION
Investigate whether or not the club is 'truly private' and can pass the
private club exemption test:
QUESTIONS:
* does the club...
have an admission procedure that is genuinely selective ?
have formal membership procedures?
123. See Sawyer, Tee'd Off Women Go/fers, J. of LEG. ASPECTS SPORT 3:1 (Spring 1993).
124. Many regional governments have defined "private club" narrowly, forcing those who do
not meet the definition to abide by nondiscrimination statute for public accommodations.
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have a degree of control over its governance?
make a profit?
have a history of selectivity?
allow nonmembers to use the facilities?
have substantial dues?
advertise for members?
have a statement of purpose that is consistent with its
actions?
have formalities?
operate a food stand that is open to nonmembers and inter-
state travelers?
have annual tournaments that involve nonmembers from
other states?
allow visiting athletic teams to play on its course?
link membership benefits to residency in a narrow geo-
graphical area?
reject a significant number of applicants for membership?
purchase equipment or food products from another state?
have a liquor license?
allow the furtherance of business opportunities for
members?
have a lower tax rate?
ACTION
Develop your own private club to your needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
While discrimination (whether it be equal access to admission/member-
ship into a club, equal tee times, or equality in governance) is unacceptable
in any forum, the right to form and belong to private clubs is also a basic
American right, no matter how distasteful it is. These issues create polari-
ties that need to be managed.
Recently, a great deal of attention has been given to issues of discrimina-
tion in golf. The LPGA and the PGA tours have taken strong positions
against discrimination. While some clubs have refused to change their poli-
cies, many clubs are considering the minority and women's issues very
seriously.
Kerry Graham, ' president of the LPGA's teaching division and a
teaching professional at McCormick Ranch Golf Club (Scottsdale, AZ), in-
125. See Sawyer, Tee'd off women golfers, Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, 3:1 (Spring,
1993), p. 10 .
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dicates that separate tee times have historical reasons for existing. For
many years, when most women did not work, women golfers were pleased
to play their primary golf on weekdays, leaving weekends golf times for the
men. Golf mirrors our cultural transitions, so as women play a bigger role
in business, government, and corporate America, women want greater ac-
cessibility and control of their leisure time.
When the difficult economic conditions are added to the cultural transi-
tions, more and more clubs (new ones in particular) are trying to attract
minorities and women as members and customers. Further, the trends of
continued cultural change are evidenced clearly by litigation and legislation
across the country during the eighties and early nineties. Bellwether states
like Minnesota, Michigan, and California have taken action by passing laws
against discrimination in admissions/membership policies relating to pri-
vate clubs. As a result, many clubs are searching for ways to reduce restric-
tions, such as restricted tee times.
Graham suggests the following creative solutions to reduce restrictions
such as "priority membership" systems, "special fees" for priority times,
and priority tee times by "handicap". She further indicates that we are in a
period of increasing women's involvement and leadership. The pressures to
continue toward more equal tee times access, etc., will continue. While it
cannot happen overnight, private clubs will need to be creative in finding
ways to serve women.
IS THERE ANY REASON FOR A PRIVATE GOLF/TENNIS CLUB NOT TO
HAVE GENDER-NEUTRAL RULES REGARDING ADMISSION/
MEMBERSHIP?
In Minnesota, 126 a recently passed state law denies a lower property tax
rate for private golf courses that discriminate on the basis of gender. Tee-
time restrictions based on sex disappeared.
The broader issue behind the tee-time controversy is the clash between
the traditional right of the private clubs and associations to make their own
rules about membership and privileges, versus the obligation of government
to act to prevent discriminatory conduct.
Changing societal values have caused state legislatures and courts to re-
evaluate this issue. They have decided that government-regulated privi-
leges, such as property tax benefits, liquor licenses, and environmental per-
mits, may be withheld from private clubs that discriminate. They have
decided that some clubs that receive revenue from nonmembers or where
126. See supra at 10.
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the club is used for furtherance of business opportunities, are places of pub-
lic, not private, accommodation. Therefore, they are subject to the same
rules that apply in the workplace and school.
Across the country, numerous laws and ordinances addressing these
questions will be passed. Many are in existence currently, and many are
being introduced by state or local governments as legislators respond to the
urging of constituents, primarily women. With courts more willing to up-
hold the validity of such legislation, there is no question that there will be
more laws passed soon. While some clubs (very few) will be able to remain
"truly" private by eliminating nonmember revenue, paying higher taxes,
and foregoing liquor licenses, the majority will be forced to change their
policies.
In closing, given the minimal impact of the changes on most private
clubs, the war over open tee times might be a battle clubs should have never
fought. This small controversy has ignited a greater challenge for society,
to equally protect the rights of all citizens regardless of race, religion, or
gender. The battle has been actively fought for the last three decades to
protect the rights of blacks and Jews with success. It is now time for the
fight to include women, and continue until all discrimination is eliminated.
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